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Continuous-variable quantum cryptography with discrete alphabets:
Composable security under collective Gaussian attacks
Panagiotis Papanastasiou and Stefano Pirandola
Department of Computer Science, University of York, York YO10 5GH, United Kingdom
We consider continuous-variable quantum key distribution with discrete-alphabet encodings. In
particular, we study protocols where information is encoded in the phase of displaced coherent (or
thermal) states, even though the results can be directly extended to any protocol based on finite
constellations of displaced Gaussian states. In this setting, we provide a composable security analysis
in the finite-size regime assuming the realistic but restrictive hypothesis of collective Gaussian
attacks. Under this assumption, we can efficiently estimate the parameters of the channel via
maximum likelihood estimators and bound the corresponding error in the final secret key rate.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1–4] allows two re-
mote authenticated parties to establish a shared secret
key without any assumption on the computational power
of the eavesdropper, the security being based on fun-
damental laws of quantum mechanics, such as the no-
cloning theorem [5, 6]. The first QKD protocols were
based on the use of discrete variables (DVs), i.e., dis-
crete degrees of freedom of the electromagnetic field,
such as polarization or time bins. Later, at the end of
the 90s and beginning of 2000, QKD was extended to
continuous-variables (CVs) [7, 8] by the work of Ralph [9]
and other authors [10–13], culminating in the seminal
GG02 protocol [14] based on Gaussian modulation of co-
herent states. This seminal work also introduced the no-
tion of reverse reconciliation that allowed experimental
CV-QKD to reach long distances and led to the theoret-
ical introduction of the reverse coherent information of
a bosonic channel [15, 16]. Ref. [16] was the first explo-
ration of the ultimate limits of point-to-point (i.e., re-
peaterless) QKD, culminating in 2015 with the discovery
and proof of the PLOB bound [17] (see Ref. [4, 18] for
more details on the historical developments).
Other theoretical advances in CV-QKD were the in-
troduction of thermal-state protocols [19–24] (where
Refs. [21, 22] specifically studied the extension to longer
wavelenghts, down to the microwaves), two-way quantum
communication protocols [25, 26], one-dimensional pro-
tocols [27, 28], and CV measurement-device independent
(MDI) QKD [29]. Last but not least, there was the im-
portant development of CV-QKD with discrete-alphabet
encoding. This idea was first introduced in the post-
selection protocol of Ref. [30] and later developed in a
number of works [31–39]. In particular, Refs. [30–33] con-
sidered binary and ternary alphabets of displaced coher-
ent states. Ref. [34] considered four coherent states and,
later, other works studied alphabets with arbitrary num-
ber of states under pure-loss [35] and thermal-loss [36]
attacks. All these security proofs were limited to the
asymptotic case of infinite signals exchanged by the par-
ties. In particular, the security of discrete-alphabet CV
QKD has been proven asymptotically under collective
attacks using decoy-like states in Ref. [37] and, more re-
cently, under general attacks using a Gaussian bound in
Ref. [38] (see also Ref. [39]).
In this work, we depart from the asymptotic security
assumption and provide a finite-size composable proof
of the security of discrete-alphabet CV-QKD protocols.
However, this extension comes with the price of another
restriction. In fact, our analysis holds under the assump-
tion of collective Gaussian attacks [40] and, in particular,
collective entangling cloner attacks [4, 41] which results
into a realistic thermal-loss channel between the remote
parties. While the general arguments apply to any dis-
crete alphabet, we focus on the case of phase-encoded
coherent (or thermal) states, so that they are displaced
in the phase-space to create regular constellations at fixed
distance from the vacuum state. Our techniques combine
tools from Refs. [42–50]. The assumption of collective
Gaussian attack is particularly useful for the purpose of
parameter estimation, for which we follow the approach
of Refs. [42–44]. The composable proof is then obtained
by adapting the methods developed in Refs. [45, 46] for
protocols with Gaussian modulation. In particular, we
adapt an expression developed for CV-MDI-QKD [46] to
the case of a one-way QKD protocol.
The manuscript is organized as follows. In Sec. II,
we describe the discrete-alphabet (phase-encoded) QKD
protocol, for which we discuss the asymptotic security
analysis. In Sec. III, we discuss parameter estimation
in the presence of finite-size effects and, in Sec. IV, we
provide the key rate of the protocol in the composable
security framework. Sec. V is for conclusions.
II. ASYMPTOTIC SECURITY OF A
PHASE-ENCODED PROTOCOL
In a generic phase-encoded CV-QKD protocol with N
states, Alice randomly chooses betweenN coherent states
|αk〉 with amplitude αk := 2−1α exp(i2kπN−1), where
α ≥ 0 and k = 1, . . . , N − 1 (so that the classical label
k is chosen with probability Pk = N
−1). More generally,
she prepares her mode A in one of N displaced thermal
states ρA|k with amplitudes αk, each with a fixed mean
number of photons n¯th. In terms of quadrature operators
xˆA := (qˆA, pˆA)
T (with the quantum shot noise equal to
21), Alice’s conditional thermal state has mean value
x¯A|k := Tr(xˆAρk) = α
(
cos
(
2kπN−1
)
sin
(
2kπN−1
)) (1)
and covariance matrix (CM) VA|k = (νth + 1)I, where
νth = 2n¯th and I is the bidimensional identity matrix.
The signal state ρA|k is traveling through a Gaussian
(thermal-loss) channel which is under the full control of
Eve. This is described by transmissivity τ and injected
thermal noise ω ≥ 1. This channel can always be dilated
into an entangling cloner attack [40], where Eve has a
two-mode squeezed-vacuum (TMSV) state ρeE0 with zero
mean x¯eE0 = (0, 0, 0, 0) and CM
VeE0 =
(
ωI
√
ω2 − 1Z√
ω2 − 1Z ωI
)
, (2)
where Z = diag{1,−1}. In particular, mode e is mixed
with Alice’s traveling mode A in a beam-splitter with
transmissivity τ described by the symplectic matrix
B(τ) =
( √
τI
√
1− τI
−√1− τI √τI
)
. (3)
After the interaction, modes e′ and E0 are kept in a
quantum memory for an optimal final measurement tak-
ing into consideration all the classical communication be-
tween the parties. For each use of the channel, Eve’s and
Bob’s conditional output state ρBe′E0|k has mean value
and CM given by
x¯Be′E0|k = [B(τ)⊕ I](x¯A|k ⊕ x¯eE0) = x¯B|k ⊕ x¯e′E0|k
(4)
VBe′E0|k = [B(τ)⊕ I]
(
VA|k ⊕VeE0
)
[B(τ)T ⊕ I]
=
(
B C
CT Ve′E0|k
)
. (5)
At the output, assume that Bob applies heterodyne
measurement with outcome (qB , pB) (the analysis can
be easily adapted to considering the case of switching
homodyne detections). Then, Eve’s doubly-conditional
state ρE′e|kqBpB has mean value and CM [51–53]
x¯e′E0|qBpBk = x¯e′E0|k −CT(B+ I)−1
[
x¯B|k −
(
qB
pB
)]
,
(6)
Ve′E0|qBpBk = Ve′E0|k −CT(B+ I)−1C (7)
while the probability of the outcome is given by
PqBpB |k =
e−
1
2
[qB−
√
τα cos(2kpiN−1)]2+[pB−
√
τα sin(2kpiN−1)]2
Ω
2πΩ
,
(8)
with Ω := 2 + τνth + (1− τ)(ω − 1). Setting
qB + ipB = βe
i(2lπN−1+θ), (9)
with β ≥ 0 and θ ∈ [−πN−1, πN−1], we obtain
Pβθl|k =
1
2πΩ
e
−[β cos(2lpiN−1+θ)−√τα cos(2lpiN−1)]2
2Ω
×e
−[β sin(2lpiN−1+θ)−√τα sin(2lpiN−1)]2
2Ω . (10)
Integrating over for β and for θ, we derive
Pl|k =
∫∫ ∞,πN−1
0,−πN−1
βPβθl|kdβdθ, (11)
which can be calculated numerically. Here l is Bob’s
estimator of Alice’s encoding variable k. Using Bayes’
formula we may write
Pk|l =
Pl|kPk∑N−1
k=0 PkPl|k
, (12)
and compute the residual entropy
H(k|l) =
∑
l
Pl
∑
k
(−Pk|l log2 Pk|l) . (13)
The mutual information between the variables k and l
is given by
I(k : l) = H(k)−H(k|l) = log2N −H(k|l). (14)
In reverse reconciliation (RR), Eve’s information on l is
bounded by the Holevo quantity
χ(E : l) = S(ρE)−
∑
l
PlS(ρE|l) (15)
with E := e′E0, where ρE :=
∑
l PlρE|l is non-Gaussian,
and the conditional state ρE|l is calculated by using the
replacement of Eq. (9) in the Gaussian state ρE|qBpBk [54]
and averaging over the probability Pkβθ|l, i.e., we have
ρE|l =
N−1∑
k=0
∫∫ ∞,πN−1
0,−πN−1
Pβθk|lρE|βθlkdθdβ, (16)
where
Pβθk|l =
Pβθl|kPk
Pl
. (17)
Thus, the asymptotic secret key rate in RR is given
by [55]
R = ξI(k : l)− χ(E : l), (18)
where ξ ∈ [0, 1] is the reconciliation efficiency. In Fig. 1,
we have plotted this rate (solid black line) for the case
of two-states N = 2 with ξ = 1 assuming excess noise
ε := τ−1(1 − τ)(ω − 1) = 0.01 and setting α = 2. In
Fig. 2, we have shown the corresponding rate for N = 3,
assuming the same parameters.
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FIG. 1: The secret key rate for N = 2 versus the attenuation
in dB. We have assumed α = 2 and excess noise ε = 0.01: It is
included the asymptotic case with ξ = 1 (black solid line) and
the composable case assuming ǫs = ǫh = 10
−20, ǫPE = 10
−10,
p = 0.8, ξ = 0.99 and r = 0.01 for n = 1012 (blue dashed line)
and n = 109 (blue solid line). All the lines have a truncation
accuracy of 10 Fock-basis states. For comparison, we have also
plotted the corresponding asymptotic rate (grey solid line)
assuming a pure loss channel.
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FIG. 2: The secret key rate for N = 3 versus the attenuation
in dB. We have assumed α = 2 and excess noise ε = 0.01: It is
included the asymptotic case with ξ = 1 (black solid line) and
the composable case assuming ǫs = ǫh = 10
−20, ǫPE = 10
−10,
p = 0.8, ξ = 0.99 and r = 0.01 for n = 1012 (blue dashed line)
and n = 109 (blue solid line). All the lines have a truncation
accuracy of 10 Fock-basis states. For comparison, we have also
plotted the corresponding asymptotic rate (grey solid line)
assuming a pure loss channel.
III. CHANNEL PARAMETER ESTIMATION
The asymptotic rate in Eq. (18) is a function of Al-
ice’s encoding parameters, i.e., α, N and νth, together
with the channel parameters, i.e., τ and ω, or equiva-
lently τ and ε. In order to estimate the parameters of
the channel, Alice and Bob sacrifice m signal states. By
communicating their outcomes for these m signals, Al-
ice and Bob can compute estimators for τ and Vε := τε,
and corresponding confidence intervals. They can choose
worst-case parameters to be used in the computation of
the key rate in Eq. (18).
Therefore, assume that Alice reveals the encoding k
of m signal states out of a block of M = m + n signal
states. For m sufficiently large, we have that m/N can
be chosen to be an integer. Bob will have samples Bki for
i = 1 . . .m/N associated to a specific Alice’s encoding k.
Because we assume heterodyne detection, the discussion
of the qˆ and pˆ quadratures is symmetric. In the qˆ quadra-
ture, Bob’s sampled q-quadratures Bki can be described
by the following stochastic variable
qBk =
√
τ
2
α cos (2kπ/N) + qno, (19)
qno :=
√
τ
2
qth +
√
1− τ
2
qE +
√
1
2
qh, (20)
where qth is Alice preparation noise with variance νth +
1, qE is Eve’s noise variable with variance ω, and qh is
the noise variable due to Bob’s heterodyne measurement.
The variable qBk is Gaussian with mean
E(qBk ) =
√
τ
2
α cos (2kπ/N) , (21)
and variance
Vno =
1
2
Ω =
1
2
(τνth + Vε + 2) . (22)
We can then create maximum likelihood estimators for
the mean value and variance of qBk starting from the
samples Bki. In fact, we may write
̂¯qBk = Nm
m/N∑
i=1
Bki, V̂nok =
N
m
m/N∑
i=1
(
Bki − ̂¯qBk)2 . (23)
The mean value and variance of the estimator ̂¯qBk are
given by
E
(̂¯qBk) = Nm
m/N∑
i=1
E (Bki) = E(qBk), (24)
Var
(̂¯qBk) = N2m2
m/N∑
i=1
Var (Bki) =
N
m
Vno, (25)
since Bki can be considered to be i.i.d. variables (in a
collective Gaussian attack).
Note that the estimator ̂¯qBk can be replaced by its
expected value E(qBk) due to the fact that its variance
in Eq. (25) vanishes for m ≫ 1. Thus, we can write the
variance estimator V̂nok in Eq. (23) as
V̂nok = Vno
N
m
m/N∑
i=1
(
Bki − E(qBk)√
Vno
)2
. (26)
4The term inside the brackets follows a standard normal
distribution with zero mean and unit variance. There-
fore, the sum term follows a chi-squared distribution with
mean equal to m/N and variance 2m/N . Consequently,
for the mean and variance of the estimator V̂nok we obtain
E
[
V̂nok
]
=Vno
N
m
E
m/N∑
i=1
(
Bki − E(qBk)√
Vno
)2
= Vno, (27)
Var
[
V̂nok
]
=V 2no
(
N
m
)2
Var
m/N∑
i=1
(
Bki − E(qBk )√
Vno
)2
= 2
N
m
V 2no. (28)
Based on the estimator ̂¯qBk we can build an estimator
for the transmissivity [cf. Eq. (19)]
τˆk = 2α
−2 cos−2 (2kπ/N) (̂¯qBk)2. (29)
The estimator ̂¯qBk is the sample mean of Bki and as such
follows a Gaussian distribution. We then can express
Eq. (29) with the help of the chi-squared variable χk ≡(√
m
N
̂¯qBk√
Vno
)2
as follows
τˆk = 2
Vno
[α cos (2kπ/N)]2
N
m
(√
m
N
̂¯qBk√
Vno
)2
. (30)
Because χk has mean value 1 +
m
N
τ [α cos(2kπ/N)]2
2Vno
and
variance 2
(
1 + 2mN
τ [α cos 2kπ/N ]2
2Vno
)
, the estimator of the
transmissivity has mean and variance equal to
E (τˆk) =
2VnoN
mα2 cos2 (2kπ/N)
×
(
1 +
m
N
τ [α cos (2kπ/N)]2
2Vno
)
= τ +O(1/m), (31)
Var (τˆk) := σ
2
k =
(
2VnoN
mα2 cos2 (2kπ/N)
)2
× 2
(
1 + 2
m
N
τ [α cos (2kπ/N)]2
2Vno
)
= 8τ
N
m
Vno
α2 cos2 (2kπ/N)
+O(1/m2). (32)
Since there will be other estimators corresponding to
the other values of Alice’s encoding k, we can create an
optimal linear combination of them with variance [43]
σ2q =
[
N−1∑
k=0
(σ2k)
−1
]−1
= 8τ
N
m
Vno
α2
[
N−1∑
k=0
cos (2kπ/N)
]−1
= τ
16
m
Vno
α2
. (33)
So far, we have used only samples from the q-
quadrature of Bob’s outcomes. Similar relations will hold
for the p-quadrature. Combining all the available q- and
p-samples, the optimal linear estimator τˆ of the trans-
missivity will have
E(τˆ ) = τ, Var(τˆ ) := σ2 = τ
8
m
Vno
α2
. (34)
In fact, for large m, we can approximate all the 2N esti-
mators τˆk to have Gaussian distributions with the same
mean and variance σ2p = σ
2
q . As a result, the global es-
timator τˆ is a Gaussian variable with the same mean
τ and variance equal to σ2. Now, assuming an error
ǫPE = 10
−10 for channel parameter estimation (PE), we
have to consider a 6.5 standard deviation interval for τ .
This means that the worst-case value for the transmis-
sivity is equal to
τ ǫPE = τ − 6.5
√
τ
8
m
Vno
α2
. (35)
Starting from V̂nok we may also define an estimator for
the excess noise. Solving Eq. (22) with respect to Vε, we
obtain
V̂εk = 2V̂nok − τˆ νth − 2. (36)
Then the mean and variance of this estimator are given
by
E
[
V̂εk
]
= 2Vno − τνth − 2, (37)
Var
[
V̂εk
]
:= s2k = 8
N
m
V 2no + σ
2ν2th, (38)
where we have used Eqs. (27), (28) and (34). The vari-
ance of the optimal linear combination V̂ε of all the es-
timators V̂εk (also considering the p-quadrature) is given
by
s2 =
4V 2no
m
+
σ2ν2th
2N
. (39)
Based on the assumption of large m, we approximate
the distribution of each V̂nok to be Gaussian. As a re-
sult, the distribution of V̂ε is Gaussian with the same
mean and variance given by s2 above. Assuming an er-
ror ǫPE = 10
−10, we obtain the 6.5 confidence intervals
for V̂ε. Therefore, the worst-case value is give by
V ǫPEε = Vε + 6.5
√
4V 2no
m
+
σ2ν2th
2N
. (40)
Using the worst-case values τ ǫPE and V ǫPEε , we can
write a finite-size expression of the key rate R = R(τ, Vε)
of Eq. (18) which accounts for the imperfect parameter
estimation and the reduced number of signals. This is
give by replacing
R(τ, Vε)→ n
M
R(τ ǫPE , V ǫPEε ) :=
n
M
RǫPE . (41)
5IV. COMPOSABLE SECURITY UNDER
COLLECTIVE ATTACKS
Our approach for the composable security is based on
techniques from Refs. [45–50]. After the parties exchange
n signal states and apply error correction (EC), they
share a state ρ˜n from which, according to the leftover
hash lemma, they can extract sn bits of uniform random-
ness, or in other words secret key bits. This number of
bits is bounded according to the following relation [47, 48]
sn ≥ Hǫsmin(ln|En)ρ˜n+2 log2 2ǫh−leakn,EC(n, ǫcor). (42)
Here, Hǫsmin(l
n|En) is the smooth min-entropy of
Bob’s variable l conditioned on Eve’s systems E, and
leakEC(n, ǫcor) is the classical information exchanged by
the parties for EC (stored by Eve in her register). The
uniform randomness ǫh and smoothing ǫs parameters de-
fine the secrecy of the protocol ǫsec = ǫh+ǫs which, along
with the EC parameter ǫcor, defines the security parame-
ter ǫtot = ǫcor+ǫsec. The latter bounds the trace distance
D of the state ρ¯n (after privacy amplification) from the
ideal output state ρid of a QKD protocol, i.e., a classical-
quantum state where the uniformly distributed classical
registers of Alice and Bob are uncorrelated from Eve’s
systems [50]. Each of the epsilon parameters introduced
above can be considered to be very small, of the order of
10−20 or less.
Eq. (42) can be further simplified so as to be connected
with the asymptotic secret key rate. In fact, we can fur-
ther bound the smooth min entropy calculated in terms
of ρ˜n with the smooth min entropy of the state before
EC ρ⊗n, which is in a tensor-product form due to the
fact that we assumed a collective attack. More precisely,
we adapt the result of Ref. [46, Th. 1], there developed
for CV-MDI-QKD, to the case of one-way protocols and
write
Hǫsmin(l
n|En)ρ˜n ≥ H
2
3pǫs
min (l
n|En)ρ⊗n (43)
+ log2[p (1− 2ǫs/3)].
Here p is the probability of successful EC, i.e., the prob-
ability that the protocol is not aborted after Alice and
Bob have compared hashes of their sequences (see also
Ref. [4, 45]). The value of 1 − p is given by the experi-
mental frame error rate [56]. Note that, even if the pro-
tocol does not abort (because the hashes are the same),
Alice’s and Bob’s sequences are identical up to an error
probability ǫcor.
The replacement in Eq. (43) allows us to use the
asymptotic equipartition property (AEP) theorem [49]
so as to reduce the conditional smooth-min entropy of
the tensor-product form ρ⊗n to the conditional von Neu-
mann entropy S(l|E)ρ of the single copy ρ. In particular,
one may write the following [48]
H
2
3pǫs
min (l
n|En)ρ⊗n ≥ nS(l|E)ρ
−√n∆AEP
(
2
3
pǫs, |L|
)
, (44)
where
∆AEP(ǫs, |L|) := 4 log2
(
2
√
|L|+ 1
)√
log(2/ǫ2s ). (45)
The parameter |L| is the cardinality of Bob’s outcome
(alphabet) and, in our case, it is equal to N . One can in
fact bound the entropic quantities appearing in Ref. [48,
Result 5] to obtain Eq. (45).
Replacing Eqs. (43) and (44) in Eq. (42), we obtain
the following bound for the number of secret bits
sn ≥ nS(l|E)ρ −
√
n∆AEP
(
2
3
pǫs, N
)
+ log2[p (1− 2ǫs/3)] + 2 log2 2ǫh − leakEC(n, ǫcor). (46)
In order to further simplify the bound above, consider
the definition of quantum mutual information between
two systems Q and E in terms of the (conditional) von
Neummann entropy
I(Q : E) = S(Q)− S(Q|E). (47)
When Q is a classical system described by a variable l,
I(l : E) takes the form of the Holevo Information χ(E : l)
and the von Neumann entropy simplifies to the Shannon
entropy H(l). Thus we can write
S(l|E)ρ = H(l)ρ − χ(E : l)ρ. (48)
Moreover, let us set the quantity
H(l)ρ − n−1leakEC(n, ǫcor) := ξI(k : l)ρ, (49)
where I(k : l) is the classical mutual information be-
tween Alice’s and Bob’s variables and ξ ∈ [0, 1] defines
the reconciliation efficiency [57]. As a result, the asymp-
totic secret key rate of Eq. (18) appears if we make the
previous replacements in Eq. (46) obtaining
sn ≥ nRρ −
√
n∆AEP
(
2
3
pǫs, N
)
+ log2[p (1− 2ǫs/3)] + 2 log2 2ǫh. (50)
Finally, let us account for the PE in the bound above.
This means that we need to write Eq. (50) considering
the worst-case scenario state ρn−mǫPE , where the channel
parameters τ and Vε are bounded by τ
ǫPE and V ǫPEε , and
also accounting for the fact that we sacrificed m out of n
signal states. Therefore, we obtain
sn−m ≥ (n−m)RǫPE −
√
n−m∆AEP
(
2
3
pǫs, N
)
+ log2[p (1− 2ǫs/3)] + 2 log2 2ǫh, (51)
where RǫPE is the finite-size rate of Eq. (41). This is
true only with probability 1 − ǫPE since there is a non-
zero probability ǫPE that the actual values of the channel
parameters are not bounded by τ ǫPE and V ǫPEε . Dividing
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FIG. 3: The fidelity between two signal states (N = 2) for
k = 0 and k = 1 versus the thermal preparation noise νth. We
have included plots for different amplitudes α = 0.5 (solid
line), α = 1 (dashed line) and α = 2 (dashed-dotted line).
As the thermal noise increases, the fidelity between the two
states arrives at a saturation point close to one. The smaller
the value of α the fastest this saturation happens.
Eq. (51) by the total number n of signal states and setting
r = mn , we obtain the corresponding secret key rate
Rn,r ≥(1− r)
[
RǫPE −
1√
(1− r)n∆AEP
(
2
3
pǫs, N
)
+ ((1− r)n)−1 {log2[p (1− 2ǫs/3)] + 2 log2 2ǫh}
]
,
(52)
which is valid up to an overall ǫtot = ǫcor+ ǫs+ ǫh + ǫPE.
In Fig. 1, we have plotted the composable key rate
for the protocol with two states (N = 2) versus the at-
tenuation in dB for r = 0.01, n = 1012 (blue dashed
line) and n = 109 (blue solid line). We assumed ex-
cess noise ε = 0.01 and set the security parameters to
ǫs = ǫh = 10
−20 and ǫPE = 10−10 so that the main con-
tribution against the security of the protocol is due to
the PE procedure. We have then assumed a reconcilia-
tion efficiency parameter equal to ξ = 0.99. Note that, in
our analysis the EC error ǫcor is contained in ξ. In Fig. 2,
we have plotted the secret key rate for N = 3 both in the
asymptotic (black line) and in the composable security
regime (blue lines) for channel excess noise ε = 0.01. As
expected, the performance of the protocol is dependent
on the number n of signals.
As we can see in Fig. 3, increasing preparation
(trusted) thermal noise νth [23], the fidelity [4, Eq. (A15)]
of the signal states increases, making them more difficult
to distinguish, resulting in a better secret key rate per-
formance. In more detail, we observe that the fidelity
reaches a saturation point faster when α is smaller. In
addition, the fidelity in this point is closer to 1 as α is
smaller. Taking into consideration the channel propa-
gation, this leads to a configuration where Bob’s states
may have almost the initial fidelity, while the fidelity of
Eve’s states may be at the saturation point. This can
happen for example for transmissivities that are close to
1. An additional optimal thermal preparation noise value
can boost this effect for other transmissivities. In fact,
we can observe this in Fig. 4, where we consider excess
noise ε = 0.01 and preparation noise νth = 0.1, i.e., Al-
ice sending thermal states. We observe an advantage for
the secret key rate when we use preparation noise that
compensates the rate degradation due to the finite-size
effects.
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FIG. 4: The secret key rate for N = 2 and νth = 0.1 versus the
attenuation in dB. We have assumed α = 2 and excess noise
ε = 0.01: It is included the asymptotic case with ξ = 1 (red
solid line) and the composable case assuming ǫs = ǫh = 10
−20,
ǫPE = 10
−10, p = 0.8, ξ = 0.99 and r = 0.01 for n = 1012
(yellow dashed line) and n = 109 (yellow solid line). For
comparison, we have also plotted the secret key rate assum-
ing coherent states (νth = 0, black solid line). We observe
an advantage when we use preparation trusted noise (com-
pare red and black lines) that can be exploited to mitigate
the decrease of the rate in the finite-size regime (similar per-
formance of yellow dashed line and black solid line). All the
lines have a truncation accuracy of 12 Fock-basis states.
V. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
In this work, we have studied the finite-size composable
security of a discrete-alphabet CV-QKD protocol un-
der the assumption of collective Gaussian attacks. This
assumption is realistic because the standard model of
loss and noise in optical quantum communications is the
memoryless thermal-loss channel, which is dilated into a
collective entangling cloner attack, i.e., a specific type of
collective Gaussian attack [40]. Our analysis extends pre-
vious asymptotic analyses [38, 39] to the finite-size and
composable regime, but simultaneously pays the price to
be restricted to collective Gaussian attacks. Removing
this assumption is the subject of future investigations.
Since our analysis applies not only to displaced coher-
ent states but also to displaced thermal states, it can be
useful for studying the security of phase-encoded proto-
cols at frequencies lower than the optical. Moreover, the
7use of displaced thermal states can increase the difficulty
in distinguishing the signal states with a beneficial effect
for the secret key rate. It is also worth to stress that our
derivation, described for phase-encoded signals, can im-
mediately be extended to any configuration or constella-
tion of displaced Gaussian states (e.g., coherent, thermal
or squeezed), besides the fact that it also applies to CV-
QKD protocols based on the Gaussian modulation of the
amplitudes of Gaussian states (e.g., coherent, thermal or
squeezed). As a matter of fact, the formalism of Sec. IV
does not change. The most crucial part is the finite-
size rate RǫCPE which can always be estimated, under
the assumption of collective Gaussian attacks, by using
maximum likelihood estimators and their confidence in-
tervals, i.e., adopting simple variations of the technique
in Sec. III. In this way, the finite-size rate RǫCPE can al-
ways be expressed in terms of the asymptotic key rate R
of the specific protocol under consideration via the trans-
formation in Eq. (41).
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